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STUDENT NOTES
ArTmTrTs, PAEPAn
oN A MATErn or DFGREE.*-In a recent case the
prisoners were convicted under Ky. Statute 1159-a which provides -punishment for "
any person
who shall by means of explosives
attempt to open any safe.
"
The evidence disclosed
tbat the prisoners, intending to open the safe, took tools and explosives
and having entered the building, forced the night-watchman to lead
them to the third floor and point out the room in which the safe was
located, and had bound the watchman before they were arrested.
The court cited with approval from Bishop's Criminal Law, Vol. II,
Sec. 728, "An attempt is an intent to do a particular thing which the
law, either common or statutory, has declared to be a crime, coupled
with an act toward the doing, sufficient both in magnitude and proximity to the act intended to be taken cognizance of by the law that
does not concern itself with things trivial and small." Alford et al.
v.
nmonwealth, 240 Ky. 513, 42 S. W (2nd) 711 (1931).
Unquestionably the possession of burglar's tools and firearms, the
forcible entry and the assault on the watchman were sufficient to
supply the overt act necessary to the conviction for -the offence. Dicta
in Reagan v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 83, 288 S. W 1026 (1927), indicated that the trespass to property alone was a sufficient act. That
was a case in which the prisoner, armed with burglar tools, climbed
to the roof of a neighboring building and opened a window lnto a
jewelry storeroom. He was caught by a nightwatchman before he
entered. There have been convictions in much weaker cases. In
Griffin v. State, 26 Ga. 493 (1858), the prisoner took an impression of
Ithe lock on a warehouse and Ilad a key made to fit. This was held
indictable although -it
was not showin that he intended to use the key
himself. In another instance -the defendant carried his tools to a
house, laid them down and went back to get a tool he had forgotten.
Held guilty. People v. Lawton, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 126 (1867). Defendant
was caught while exami:mng a house to pick out a fit place to break
whnen he was caught and found guilty People v. gullivan, 173 N. Y.
122, 65 N. B. 989 (1903).
While the principal case is too clear to be interesting in its facts
the discussion in the opinion and the quotation from Bishop raise -the
troublesome question of the distinction between mere preparation
and an overt act of the kind that will support a conviction.
The courts treated the first attempt cases as if the intent were the
thing punished. Reg. v. Roberts, 25 L. J. M. 0. 17, 7 Cox, (. C. 39
(1855). But they demanded that the intent be evidenced by some act.
*The following material will be found helpful on this subject.
16 Har. L. Rev. 491, 501, 41 Har. L. Rev. 821, 843.
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State v. Marshall, 14 Ala. 410 (18,48), People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159
(1859). So the requirements for an attempt are the same as for any
other criunal offence. However a distinction is made so that any act
is not sufficient. Nider v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 684, 131 S. W 1024,
Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1246 (1910), fx Parte Floyd, 7 CaL App. 588, 95
Pac. 175 (1908).
The following cases in which there were both acts and intepit
were found to be merely preparation and not indictable attempts.
Groves v. State, 116 Ga. 516, 42 S. E. 755 (1902), in which the defendants hired a hack, procured masks and ascertained that their intended
victim was not armed. People v. Youngs, 122 Mich. 292, 81 N. W 114
(1899), defendant procured burglar's tools and met a confederate at
a distance from the house they intended to rob. Putting the finger
o1i the trigger of a pistol at half-cock, or otherwise not in condition
to be discharged, is not an attempt to shoot. Rex v. Harrzs, 5 C. & P.
159 (1831). Defendant eloped with his niece and sent a friend to get
a magistrate to perform & ceremony; not an attempt to commit an
incestuous marriage. People v. Murray, supra. Sending an order to
a firm in San Francisco to ship whiskey to a point in Alaska was no
attempt to introduce whiskey into Alaska. U. S. v. Stephens, 8 Sawy
116, 12 Fed. 52 (1882).
The expressions by wnch courts endeavor to distinguish between
the kind of acts which are sufficient and those which are not are many
and varied but they are all extremely vague and general. Kenny,
Outlines of Criminal Law, p. 81, May's Criminal Law, Sec. 83. "There
must be an 'overt act.'"
State V. Thompson, 212 Pac. (Okla.) 1026
(1923). "The overt act must be sufficiently proximate to the intended
crime to form one of the natural series of acts which the intent requires for its full execution." Commonwealth v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10,
42 Atl. 374 (1899). "There must be an act ddne which more or less
directly tends to the comnumssion of the crime." Leverett v. State, 20
Ga. App. 748, 93 S. E. 232 (1917), Groves v. State, 116 Ga. 516, 42 S. E.
755, 59 L. R. A. 598 (1902). "There must be an act in part execution
of the crime." Nider v. Commonwealth, supra; Flowers v. Continental
Casualty Co., 140 Iowa 510, 118 N. W 761 (1908), State v. Donovan,
90 Atl. (Del.) 220 (1914). "The actual transaction must have commenced." Reg. v. Cheeseman, 1 Leigh & C., C. C. 140, 9 Cox, 0. G. 100
(1862). "A step must be taken which can be regarded as the beginning of the actual commission of the crime intended."
People v.
Murray,14 Cal. 159 (1859).
None of the tests listed above.mark definitely the distinction between preparation and an attempt. Other more practical tests have
been offered: "The. last 'human act necessary." Lovett v. State, 19
Tex. 174 (1857), Reg. v. Eagleton, 24 L. J. M. . 158, 166, 6 Cox. C. C.
559 (1855), U S. v. Stephens, 8 Sawy. 116 (1882), Sipple v. State, 46
N. J. L. 197 (1884). Tis test will settle clear cases satisfactorily.
For instance in People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac. 800 (1892),

STUDENT NoTEs
the prisoner shot through a knot-hole in the roof 'with intent to hit
a policeman who he thought was watching him. The policeman was in
fact on another bart of the building but the prisoner was iproperly
convicted.
Nevertheless this test is found to be imperfect when applied to
border-line cases and especially in "impossibility" cases, as witness
the case suggested by Justice Holmes of the man who shot at a post
thinking it was his enemy. Nor is the converse of the rule true. In
Weaver v. State, 116 Ga. 550, 42 S. E. 745 (1902), the defendant threw
kerosene on a house but left without making an effort to light it and
he was convicted of an attempt to commit arsoli although he had not
done the last human act necessary. See criticism of this test in Uhl
v. Commonwealth, 6 Gratt, State 706 (1849).
Many courts have recognized the impossibility of laying down a
hard and fast formula for determining the'boundary line. Holmes, J.
in Uommo= wealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. D. 770 (1897), decides "Every question of proximity must be determined by its own
circumstances and analogy is too imperfect to give much help. Any
ipnlawful application of poison is an -evil which threatens death,
according to common apprehension, and the gravity of the crime, the
uncertainty of the result, and the seriousness of the apprehension,
coupled wfth the great harm likely to result from the poison even if
not enough to kill, would warrasht holding liability for an attempt to
begin at a point more remote from the possibility of accomplishing
what is expected than might be the case with lighter crimes."
The same authority states in his lectures on the Common Law at
page 68 "Eminent judges have puzzled where to draw the line, or to
state the principle on which it should be drawn, betweeol these two
sets of cases. But the principle is believed to be similar to that on
which all other lines are drawn by the law. Public policy, that is to
say, legislative considerations are -t the bottom :of the matter; the
considerations being, in this case the nearness of the canger, the
greatness of the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt."
"It is a question of degree." Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass.
267, 59 N. E. 55 (1901), 16 Har. L. Rev. 491, 503; Clarke's Criminal
Law, p. 127.
However helpful some of the other formulas may be in particular
cases the authorities are substantially 3a agreement that each case
must be decided on its own facts, after giving due consideration to
such factors as the seriousness of the crime intended, the apprehension
caused to society, the likelihood of consummation, proximity in time
and place to the crime intended and infringement on personal and
property rights. See Bishop's Crinmnal Law Vol. I, See. 729 (2),
May's Criminal Law Sec. 183.
The facts in Reg. v. McCann, 28 U. C. Q. B. 514 (1869), were
almost the same as in People v. Sullivan, supra, yet the prisoner in
one was held guilty of an attempt and in the -other was acquitted. In
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People v. Youngs, supra, the defendant procured burglar's tools and
met a confederate at a distance from the house they expected to rob.
Held not guilty. Yet in People v. Stites, 75 Cal. 570, 17 Pac. 693 (1888),
defendant was convicted of an attempt to place a bomb on a railroad
track when he was caught before he had reached the rendezvous with
his confederate. Many other examples of courts arriving at opposite
conclusions on similar states of fact could be given. This can be
attributed not to a difference in the law but to difference in judgment
as to the importance of the act done and the notice it deserves from
the law. It is submitted that this is as it should be because under a
flexible rule of this sort justice is more certain in a field of criminal
law where the number of possible situations is infinite, than it would
be under a strictly technical rule which could not possibly cover all
the factors which should be considered.
BRUCE MORFORD.
TuE EFFECT OF IirPOSSIBILITy ON CIIINTAL ATTE.PTs.* A-MEANS

USEn MUST BE APPARENTLY SuiTABLE.-It is difficult to say that any
particular means will certainly effect any particular end. The best
laid plans of which we may conceive are frustrated. The best rifles
loaded, Capped, primed and well aimed, may gmss fire; or the party
shot at may wear a coat of impenetrable armor. How then may we
under any circumstances do more than to say of any particular
agency, that it is "apparently" adapted to produce the end? The means
used must be apparently adequate, though the actor, by using such
means, is totally incapable of accomplishing the intended consummation.
In apparent conflict with the above view is a group of English
cases on statutes. In Rex v. Love?, 2 Moody & R. 39 (1837), it was
held "shooting of another person does not take place when the other
person is not in the place shot at, and that there can be no shooting
with 'loaded arms' when a gun is so stuffed that it cannot be fired."
In 1835 an English Court, Rex v. Whitley, 1 Lewin, C. C. 123, held
that if the -gun does not contain a sufficient amount of powder to be
discharged no attempt has been committed. But the ground on which
these cases were decided was that the statute used the words "loaded
arms," etc.' which were incorporated in the indictment, and averment
of which had to be substantially proved. On the other hand, the
offense is not an attempt if the party threatened knew the gun was not
loaded and was therefore not adaptable to doing harm. The same is
true for attempts at poisoning, State v. Clanssa, 11 Ala. 57 (1847), and
attempts to produce abortion by means of drugs, Bates v. U. S. 10 Fed.
92 (1881). But if the means used are both absolutely and apparently
inadequate, as where a man threatens another with witchery or points
* The following authorities will be found helpful: Wharton Criminal Law, 11th Ed., VoL 1, p. 238. May, 3rd, Ed., p. 167, 78 Umv. Penn.
L. R. 962, (1930) 41 H. L. R. 491, 840, 891, (Sayre), 19 Georgetown
L. J. 316, (1930-1931).

